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After Richmond Newspapers: A Public




The 1980 United States Supreme Court decision in Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia' is of major potential importance
to the press and to the continuing development of First
Amendment2 law. For the first time in history,' the Supreme
Court declared that the public and press have a First Amend-
ment right to attend criminal trials.4 Richmond largely neu-
tralized the decision of Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,5 which was
interpreted by many critics as an indication that the Court
would soon condone the closure of an ever-increasing number
of trials to the public and the press.6 Richmond thus repre-
sented a major victory for the press, whose triumphs in recent
years have frequently been offset by serious defeats.7 One
such defeat came over a year and a half after Richmond, when
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Cox Enterprises, Inc. d/
* Member, Third Year Class.
1. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. The significance of Richmond was recognized by Justice Stevens in his concur-
ring opinion: "This is a watershed case. Until today the Court has accorded virtually
absolute protection to the dissemination of information or ideas, but never before has
it squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitu-
tional protection whatsoever." 448 U.S. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring).
4. 448 U.S. at 580.
5. 443 U.S. 368 (1979). Gannett held that the Sixth Amendment (U.S. CONST.
amend. VI) did not give the public a right of access to pre-trial supression hearings.
443 U.S. at 384.
6. See, e.g., Media Opposes Secrecy, NEws MEDIA & THE LAw, Aug./Sept. 1979, at 4.
7. In addition to Gannett, examples of past Burger Court decisions where the
press lost major Constitutional battles include: Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979);
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1
(1978). Recent instances where the press has prevailed on important First Amend-
ment issues include: Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981); Smith v. Daily Mail Pub-
lishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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b/a Lujkin News v. Vascocu8, a case involving the closure of
pre-trial proceedings in a civil suit.9 This mixed First Amend-
ment record has led many to criticize the Burger Court for its
inadequate protection of the press.10 Nevertheless, the Rich-.
mond decision was welcomed relief for the press and its
supporters.
One issue left unresolved by the Richmond decision, though,
is whether the public right of access it established applies to
civil as well as criminal trials.1' The doubts created by this;
open question that remained following Richmond were only in..
creased by the Court's more recent refusal to hear the Lufkin
News case. i2 An answer to this question is urgently needed
since the uncertain state of present law is unsatisfactory to
both the press desiring trial access and individual litigants de-.
siring a closed trial in order to satisfy what they feel to be legit-
imate concerns. Although most civil trials have been, and
undoubtedly will continue to be, open to the public and press,
certain types of civil proceedings have in the past often been
closed, particularly where family law matters are involved.,
Richmond leaves the public, press, judiciary, and legal profes-
8. 102 S. Ct. 1622 (1982) (No. 81-1154).
9. Lutkin News involved a shareholders' derivative suit brought in a Texas state
court against a local bank. On August 3, 1981, Judge Vascocu granted a defense motion
to close the courtroom to everyone but those directly interested in the case. In so
doing, the judge reportedly stated: "This is a highly sensitive matter, and there will be
some decisions made here the public wouldn't particularly understand." San Fran-
cisco Chronicle, Mar. 2, 1982, at 8, col. 4.
While the Supreme Court's refusal to grant certiorari added no precedential value to
the Texas court's actions (Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 844 (1950)), Lufkin News
was a "defeat" in a more general sense, since it leaves judges with the power to ex-
clude the press from the courtroom under similar circumstances and conversly leaves
the press and public in doubt as to their rights in opposing such orders.
10. See generally Goodwin, Press-Court Relations: Can They Be Improved?, 7 HAs-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 633 (1980).
The Supreme Court's refusal to hear the Lufikin News case prompted Joe Murray-,
editor and publisher of the Texas newspaper that sought review, to state that the ac-
tion left "quite a legal loophole in our liberty." San Francisco Chronicle, Mar. 2, 1892, at
8, col. 4.
11. The plurality opinion deliberately skirted this issue: "Whether the public has
a right to attend trials of civil cases is a question not raised by this case ... " 448 U.S.
at 580 n.17.
12. The significance of the Court's action in the Lujkin News case was recognized
by Jack Landau, an official of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press: "Up
to now, the whole debate has had to do with closing courtrooms in cases of criminal
defendants." San Francisco Chronicle, supra note 9.
13. See notes 54-78 and accompanying text, infra.
14. See notes 168-98 and accompanying text, infra.
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sion in the dark as to whether the public and news media are
entitled to attend this type of sensitive civil proceeding. Con-
versely, while trial closure may serve legitimate individual and
social needs in these cases, the continued authority of a trial
judge to expel the public from the courtroom is brought into
serious doubt by the Richmond decision. An adequate clarifi-
cation of these issues would simultaneously promote the im-
portant public interests recognized by the Richmond Court as
served by open trials15 and aid individual litigants by clearly
delineating those exceptional circumstances in which they
may reasonably demand trial closure.
This note will discuss the issues underlying the question of
whether the public and press should have a constitutional
right to attend civil trials and will offer a prediction as to
whether the Court, if faced with the issue, will expand the First
Amendment right to attend civil trials. The possible impact of
such a decision will also be examined. In reaching answers to
these larger questions, this note will first analyze the Rich-
mond decision, examining the basis for and reasoning behind
the public's right to attend. The history of open civil trials will
be briefly discussed and comparisons will be made to the par-
allel history of public criminal trials. An examination of the
current constitutional, statutory, and common law statuses of
the public civil trial will follow. The major issues involved in
the public trial controversy will then be analyzed. Particular
attention will be given to issues raised in Richmond and earlier
decisions which have special significance in the context of civil
trials due to inherent differences between civil and criminal
trials. It will be shown that the rationale of the Richmond deci-
sion, the common law tradition of public civil trials, and the
contemporary interests served by public trials are likely to
compel the Court to create a First Amendment right to attend
civil trials. This note will explore the possible impact of such a
right, including an examination of traditional exceptions to the
public trial rule and how these exceptions may be altered.
Specific state rules authorizing trial closure will be discussed
and their continued validity will be questioned. This note will
not deal with the special issues raised by the presence of elec-
tronic broadcast media in the courtroom 6 or with the issues
15. See discussion pp. 8 & 17-19, infra.
16. The "press" as used in this note is to be understood as referring to the most
unobtrusive of reporters, without cameras or other potentially disruptive equipment.
No. 21
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involved in press and public access to pre-trial proceedings 17 or
court records. 18 Following the lead of the Supreme Court, this
note will treat the general public and the press as having an
equal right to attend trials; the note will not consider whether




It is not easy to decipher the exact legal rules established by
Richmond. The seven-to-one decision 20 contains a total of six
opinions, with only two justices" joining Chief Justice Burger
in the plurality opinion. A considerable amount of "head
counting" is therefore necessary to determine exactly what
propositions Richmond sets forth.22
The main issue to be considered here is, following Richmond, under what circum-
stances the Court is likely to find that a reporter has a right to attend and quietly
observe a civil trial. This is not to say that courtroom disruption by the press will not
be discussed at all--only that it will not be dealth with in any depth. For a discussion
of the special problems involved with broadcast media activity in the courtroom, see
Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Note, From
Estes to Chandler: The Distinction Between Television and Newspaper Trial Coverage,
560 COMM/ENT L.J. 503 (1982).
17. Gannett made it clear that the issues raised when the public and press seek:
access to criminal pre-trial proceedings are significantly different from those raised
when access is sought to the trial itself. 443 U.S. at 389-91. Access to civil pre-trial
proceedings may also raise different issues which are beyond the scope of this note.
18. See generally Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
19. While the Richmond plurality did not reach the issue of whether the press en..
joys any greater right of access than the general public, it did acknowledge the impor.-
tant role played by the press in past trial coverage:
"While media representatives enjoy the same right of access as the public,
they often are provided special seating and priority of entry so that they may
report what people in attendance have seen and heard. This 'contribute [s] to
public understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the function-
ing of the entire criminal justice system. . . .'" 448 U.S. at 573.
(quoting Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976)) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
20. Justice Powell took no part in the decision (448 U.S. at 581) and Justice
O'Connor had not yet joined the court.
21. Justice White and Justice Stevens. Both Justices also wrote their own concur-
ring opinions. Id.
22. A total of five Justices joined the two opinions written by Chief Justice Burger
and by Justice Brennan (who was joined by Justice Marshall). 448 U.S. 584-98. Any
points on which these two opinions expressly agree therefore represents a view held
by a majority of the current Court. A five Justice majority can also be reached when-
ever views expressed in both the concurring opinion written by Justice Stewart (Id. at
598-601) and that written by Justice Blackmun (Id. at 601-04) agree with those ex-
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The basic holding of the plurality opinion was that, absent an
overriding interest, criminal trials must be open to the public
and press.23 The constitutional basis of the plurality's decision
was that the public trial "is implicit in the guarantees of the
First Amendment."2 4 The First Amendment was said by the
plurality to guarantee a right of access because "[f]ree speech
carries with it some freedom to listen"25 and because of the "af-
finity" of the public trial to the right of assembly.26 The plural-
ity relied heavily on the historic common law tradition of the
public trial as a justification for its decision. The Court fur-
ther justified the open trial by finding that a public criminal
trial helps ensure the fairness of the proceedings,28 serves "an
important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for com-
munity concern, hostility, and emotion,"29 and functions to ed-
ucate the public about the workings of their judicial system,
helping to secure public understanding of, and confidence in,
that institution.3 0 However, the plurality opinion stated that
the right of access is not absolute and that overriding interests
may compel trial closure. 1
The concurring opinion written by Justice Brennan and
joined in by Justice Marshall agreed that the First Amendment
guarantees a public right to attend,32 but discussed the holding
in the broader context of the public right of access to informa-
tion in general. This opinion emphasized the "structural role"
played by the First Amendment in fostering the informed pub-
lic debate "necessary for a democracy to survive. ' 33 Justice
pressed in the plurality opinion. Additional nuances are added by the concurring opin-
ions of Justices White and Stevens and by the dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist.
23. 448 U.S. at 581.
24. Id. at 580.
25. Id. at 576.
26. Id. at 577.
27. Id. at 564-69.
28. Id. at 569.
29. Id. at 571.
30. Id. at 571-73.
31. Id. at 581-82 n.18. The plurality did not delineate any specific circumstances in
which a trial might still be closed, stating that, "We have no occasion here to define the
circumstances in which all or parts of a criminal trial may be closed to the public
.... " Id. However, the plurality later suggested that courtroom disruption by the
public might require trial closure. Id. See notes 133-34 and accompanying text, infra,
for a discussion of this problem. The plurality also suggested that a limit be placed on
public access when there is insufficient room in the courtroom and that preferential
treatment might be given to the press under these circumstances. Id.
32. Id. at 585.
33. Id. at 587-88.
No. 21
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Brennan, like Chief Justice Burger, relied on the historical
openness of Anglo-American trials in reaching his conclu-
sions. 4 The opinion also discussed the political purposes
served by the public trial,3" many of which were also set forth
in the plurality opinion. 6
The concurring opinion written by Justice Stewart briefly ex-
pressed his agreement that "the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments clearly give the press and the public a right of access to
trials themselves ... Justice Stewart stated that this right;
also included access to civil trials. 8
The concurring opinion written by Justice Blackmun ap-
proved of the other justices' reliance on history as a ground for
their decisions.39 Justice Blackmun was critical of the plural..
ity's constitutional analysis, however, and strongly reasserted
his position expressed the previous year in Gannett4' that the
public's right to attend a criminal trial is to be found in the
Sixth4' rather than the First Amendment. He finally was
"driven to conclude, as a secondary position, that the First
Amendment must provide some measure of protection for pub.-
lic access to the trial."''
Like Justice Blackmun, 3 Justice White in his concurring
opinion, restated his position in Gannett,44 that the Sixth
Amendment forbids closure of criminal proceedings "except in
narrowly defined circumstances."4 In his concurring opinion,
Justice Stevens stressed the importance of the Richmond deci-
sion" and stated that it stands for the broad proposition "that
an arbitrary interference with access to important information
34. Id. at 589-93.
35. Id. at 593-97.
36. Both the concurring opinion written by Justice Brennan and the plurality opin-
ion stated that the open trial plays a role in assuring fairness. Both opinions also as-
serted that an open trial serves to build public confidence in our method of
administering justice. See discussion notes 80-94 and accompanying text, infra.
37. Id. at 599.
38. Id.; see note 157 and accompanying text, infra.
39. Id. at 601.
40. 443 U.S. at 406 (Blackmun, J., joined by White, Marshall, and Brennan, JJ., con-
curring and dissenting in part); 448 U.S. at 603.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
42. See text accompanying notes 39-42, supra.
43. 448 U.S. at 604.
44. 443 U.S. at 406 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., con-
curring and dissenting in part).
45. 448 U.S. at 581-82.
46. Id. at 582.
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is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and of the press
protected by the First Amendment."47
Dissenting Justice Rehnquist argued vehemently that there
was no constitutional basis for review of the trial judge's deci-
sion to close the trial, asserting that the Court lacked authority
to interfere with the manner in which the state court chose to
administer justice.'
In summary, the majority in Richmond ruled that the First
Amendment requires criminal trials normally be open to the
public.49 A majority also indicated that this right is qualified in
some way,5 0 although the issue of which particular circum-
stances might still compel trial closure was not reached.51
Most of the justices based the right of access largely on the
historical tradition of public trials.52  Three of the justices
viewed this issue as an aspect of the larger issue of access to
governmental information and processes.53 This note will at-
tempt to determine if the Court is likely to extend Richmond to
include civil trials, should the justices choose to hear a case
raising this issue.
47. Id. at 583. In this respect, Justice Stevens is close to the views of Justices
Brennan and Marshall who, in their concurring opinion, considered the open trial is-
sue to be part of the larger access to government information issue. See id. at 585-89.
48. Id. at 606.
49. Seven of the eight Justices who considered the case took this view. Id. at 580
(Burger, C.J., White, Stevens, JJ.); id. at 585 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring); id.
at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Although Justice
Powell took no part in the Richmond decision, in Gannett he expressed the view that
the First Amendment extends protection to at least a limited right of access to pre-trial
suppression hearings. 443 U.S. at 397-403. Had he participated in Richmond, Justice
Powell probably would have found the same right to attend criminal trials.
50. 448 U.S. 581 n.18 (Burger, C.J., White & Stevens, JJ., judgment of the Court); id.
at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring).
51. See note 31 and accompanying text, supra.
52. 448 U.S. at 564-69 (Burger, C.J., White & Stevens, JJ.); id. at 589-93 (Brennan &
Marshall, JJ., concurring); id. at 601 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
53. See notes 32 & 47 and accompanying text, supra. The plurality opinion dis-
missed the importance of this view, stating that the way the open trial issue was la-
belled was "not crucial." 448 U.S. at 576. The perspective and analytic framework
reflected in the concurring opinions written by Justices Stevens and Brennan is of
potential importance for other purposes. Unequivocal establishment of an overall
right of public access to government information and processes or of a "right to know"
might have a tremendous social impact by influencing the manner in which govern-
ment business is conducted. The creation of a right to know would also seem to dictate
that civil trials be presumptively open. See generally Casenote, Is the Right of Access
to Trials an Instance of a First Amendment Right to Know? Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia, 42 OHIO L.J. 831 (1981); O'Brien, The First Amendment and the Public's "Right
to Know," 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 579 (1980).
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History of the Public Civil Trial
Given its importance in the Richmond Court's reasoning, 4 it
is likely that a historical analysis will also play an important
role in the determination of whether to extend the right to at-
tend to include civil trials. Many of the sources cited by the
Court in Richmond as proof of the tradition of public criminal
trials provide equal support for the position that civil trials
have been traditionally public throughout English and Ameri-
can history. The Richmond Court noted that the public charac-
ter of the early English courts indicates the antiquity of the
open criminal trial.5 These judicial entities, including the
Eyre of Kent and the county, hundred, private and King's
courts, were courts of general jurisdiction, hearing what would
today be considered civil as well as criminal matters. 6 The
public nature of these proceedings therefore provides a strong
indication that there is as longstanding a history of open civil
trials as there is of open criminal trials.57
In its historical analysis, the Richmond Court also cited
many noted jurists and historians who have commented on the
importance of the public trial in English history.58 Lord Coke
54. See note 52, supra.
55. Id.
56. Chrimes, Introductory Essay to I.W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW,
8, 13, 265. (7th ed. 1956). The distinctions between civil and criminal matters were not
as clear in the early English courts as they are today. See 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 38 (2nd 3d. 1898), where it is stated:
[T]here is no perceptible difference of authorities or procedure in civil and
criminal matters until, within a century before the [Norman] Conquest, we
find certain of the graver public offences reserved in a special manner for the
king's jurisdiction.
57. See Chrimes at 6, 9, 268. In reference to hundred courts, Chrimes states:
When visible in the light of documentary evidence, these courts showed many
features of ancient popular assemblies, meeting in the open air at regular in-
tervals of four weeks, their judgments those of peasant suitors ....
The county courts were also public:
The large number of persons, suitors, parties, jurors, officials and others con-
cerned in a meeting of a county court is a striking feature .... Id. at 6.
Attendance by tenants at the "private courts" conducted by large landholders was
compulsory. F. POLLOCK & F. MATAD, supra note 56, at 43. See note 59, infra, re-
garding the public character of the "Kings Courts."
58. 448 U.S. at 564-73, 589-91. One such writer made the following sweeping
statement:
It is one of the most conspicuous features of English justice that all judicial
trials are held in open court, to which the public have free access ....
The former appears to have been the rule in England from time immemorial,
No. 2] AFTER RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS
went so far as to suggest that the very word "court" implies an
open proceeding.5 9 Coke and the other writers quoted in Rich-
mond did not differentiate between civil and criminal matters
in their comments on the open trial tradition. Given the gen-
eral nature of early English courts,60 though, there is no reason
to believe their sweeping statements were not meant to encom-
pass civil as well as criminal trials.
The authorities cited in Richmond in support of the Court's
finding of an early American tradition of open criminal trials
also provide evidence that civil trials were public events in the
earliest days of the American colonies. 1 The early rules of the
colonial governments either expressly provided that criminal
and civil trials were to be public62 or made more broad state-
ments that all courts were to be "open."63 In accord with the
law of early America, an overwhelming number of contempo-
rary American courts and legislatures have recognized the
and much of the effectiveness of English public opinion ... may be said to be
due to it. Only in rare instances, of which the notorious Court of Star Cham-
ber is the most conspicuous, has the rule been violated; and the unpopularity
of such exceptions is the best proof of the value attached by the nation to the
general rule.
E. JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAw 73-74 (6th ed. 1967).
59. 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, SECOND PART 103. Lord Coke
wrote:
These words [In curia dimini regis] are of great importance, for all causes
ought to be heard, ordered, and determined before the judges of the kings
courts openly in the kings courts, whither all persons may resort; and in no
chambers, or other private places: for the judges are not judges of chambers,
but of courts, and therefore in open court, where the parties councell and at-
torneys attend, ought orders, rules, awards, and judgements to be made and
given, and not in chambers or other private places, where a man may lose his
case, or receive great prejudice, or delay in his absence for want of defence.
Nay, that judge that ordereth or ruleth a cause in his chamber, though his
order or rule be just, yet offendeth he the law, (as here it appeareth) because
he doth it not in court.
60. See note 56, supra.
61. 448 U.S. at 567-68.
62. See, e.g., the 1677 Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, repro-
duced in 1 B. SCHwARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 129 (1971).
63. See, e.g., the Pennsylvania Frame of Government of 1682 and the Massachu-
setts Body of Liberties of 1641, id. at 140, 72.
The word "open" in this context is subject to at least two different interpretations.
These early rules may have been intended merely to secure a potential litigant's right
of access to the courts-that is, to bestow on all members of the public a right to have
their particular cases heard by the courts. On the other hand, "open" may also be
understood to mean that the public has a right to attend all proceedings of the courts.
By citing the above authorities in support of its finding of a historical tradition of pub-
lic criminal trials, the Richmond Court apparently gave its approval to the latter inter-
pretation. 448 U.S. at 568.
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common law tradition of public civil trials. Many states have
expressly adopted the common law tradition by providing for
public trials in their constitutions,6 4 statutes or rules of court.6
The state courts have acknowledged the public civil trial tradi.-
tion everywhere that the issue has been raised.66 Even before
Richmond, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged
this tradition.67 Finally, the plurality opinion in Richmond also
explicitly recognized the historical tradition of open civil trials:
"Whether the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is
a question not raised by this case, but we note that historically
both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open."68
IV
Competing Interests in the Open Trial
Controversy
History alone, however, will not determine whether a First
Amendment right to attend civil trials will be established:
other issues will influence the outcome of this question. Simi-
64. See, e.g., ARIz. CONST. art. 2, § 11; DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 9; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18;
OR. CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
65. E.g., ARIZ. R. CIv. P. ANN. 77(d); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-109 (1962); CAL. CIrV. PROC.
CODE § 124 (West 1954); IDAHO R. Civ. P. ANN. 77(b); IOWA CODE ANN. § 605.16 (West
1975); KAN. Civ. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 60-104 (Vernon 1976); ME. R. Civ. P. ANN. 77(b);
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1420 (1981); MINN. R. Crv. P. 77.02; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.200
(Vernon 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-311 (1975); NEv. R. Crv. P. 77(b); N.Y. JuD. LAw § 4
(McKinney 1968); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-3 (1953); WASH. CT. R. ANN., CrV. RULE 77(j).
Most states also provide for certain exceptions to the general public trial rule. See text
accompanying notes 167-85, infra.
66. See, e.g., Cembrook v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 231 Cal. App. 2d 52, 41 Cal. Rptr. 492
(1964); Lecates v. Lecates, 190 A. 294 (Del. Super. Ct. 1937); State ex rel. Gore Newspa-
pers Co. v. Tyson, 313 So. 2d 777, 783 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), English v. McCrary, 348
So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977); Des Moines Register & Tribune Co. v. Hildreth, 181 N.W.2d 216
(Iowa 1970); Raper v. Berrier, 246 N.C. 193, 195, 97 S.E.2d 782, 784 (1954); Cohen v. Ever-
ett City Council, 85 Wash. 2d 385, 535 P.2d 801 (1975). Some state courts, while recog-
nizing the tradition of open civil trials, have approved of closure by the trial judge,
either on the basis of a statute or under a judge's inherent power to control the con-
duct of the trial. See Bloomer v. Bloomer, 197 Wis. 140, 221 N.W. 734 (1928).
67. A statement from Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) is often quoted in the
cases dealing with the public trial issue: "A trial is a public event. What transpires in
the court room is public property." Both the majority and the dissenters acknowl-
edged the tradition of public civil and criminal courts in Gannett. 443 U.S. 368. Justice
Stewart, in the Opinion of the Court, stated: "For many centuries, both civil and crimi-
nal trials have traditionally been open to the public." Id. at 386, n.15. The dissenting
opinion written by Justice Blackmun stated: "[T] here is little record, if any, of secret
proceedings, criminal or civil, having occurred at any time in known English history."
Id. at 420.
68. 448 U.S. at 580 n.17.
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lar kinds of issues arise in both the civil and criminal context
when the effects of public attendance are analyzed. The public
and press can influence the judge, jury, attorneys, parties, and
witnesses in both types of proceedings. 69 The parties to a civil
suit and criminal defendants all have an interest in receiving a
fair trial and in preserving as much of their personal privacy as
possible. 0 The public also has some degree of interest in fair
and orderly judicial administration in both kinds of trials.7
However, the "People" or the "State" is always a party to a
criminal trial, giving the public and press a direct and manifest
interest in all criminal matters.7 2 Except where a governmen-
tal unit is involved, or in certain exceptional cases,73 the pub-
lic's interest in civil litigation is generally not as direct or
obvious.
The more direct public interest in criminal cases is reflected
by the relative amounts of press coverage given criminal and
civil matters and in the relative degree of public awareness of
and concern about the two kinds of proceedings. It is a rare
television news broadcast that does not report on a crime or a
criminal justice proceeding, but news of civil controversies ap-
pears less frequently. 74 As a general rule, public feelings run
higher when a crime has been committed than when a contract
has been breached or tort liability incurred. Revealingly, the
great majority of cases involving the public trial controversy
have arisen in the criminal, rather than civil, context.75 Thus,
while many of the issues regarding public attendance at trial
69. See, e.g., State ex rel. Gore Newspapers Co. v. Tyson, 313 So. 2d at 781-87; Lo-
renz v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 516 F. Supp. 1151 (D. Colo. 1981).
70. See note 69, supra.
71. See note 69, supra.
72. In this regard, Blackstone stated: "Public wrongs, or crimes and misdemean-
ors, are a breach and violation of the public rights and duties due to the whole commu-
nity, considered as a community in its social aggregate capacity." 2 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1428 (Lewis ed. 1897).
73. See note 90, infra.
74. This is not to say that some kinds of civil proceedings do not make national
headlines. The various school desegregation cases are a notable example, but were
also unusual in the number of people directly affected by the outcome of the decisions.
75. While there are some state cases which deal with the open trial issue in regard
to a civil proceeding (see note 66, infra), these are far outnumbered by the criminal
cases which involved litigation of this issue. No United States Supreme Court decision
has directly addressed this issue in regard to a civil trial. This prompted one commen-
tator to state in regards to the Lutkin News case, 102 S. Ct. 1622, that "up to now, the
whole debate has had to do with closing courtrooms in cases of criminal defendants."
Jack Landau, official of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, San Fran-
cisco Chronicle, Mar. 2, 1982, at 8, col. 4.
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initially appear to be identical in either context, the degree and
nature of public and press concern with criminal trials may be
so different from their concern with civil trials that their inter-
ests in the two types of judicial proceedings are qualitatively
different. In analyzing the various interests involved, the dis-
cussion below will attempt to determine whether these differ-
ences are so fundamental that a result different from
Richmond would be reached in a case raising the question
whether the public and press have a right to attend civil trials.
The open trial question can be analyzed in terms of compet-
ing and conflicting interests. The Richmond Court took the fa-
miliar approach of balancing these interests before reaching its
decision. 6 A similar balancing approach will undoubtedly be
used in evaluating whether the public has a right to attend civil
trials. The Court is, of course, only compelled to balance those
interests which are fundamental, i.e., protected by some clause
of the Constitution, against other such fundamental rights.
The competing interests involved can be categorized as "pub-
lic" and "individual" interests. 7 7 Generally, open trials pro-
mote public interests, while closed trials protect certain
individual interests. Although this analysis is an oversimplifi-
cation of the issues, 78 it serves as a good starting point and
76. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 824 (1974); Frantz, The First Amendment
in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
77. While this note usually treats the interests of the public and the press as one
and the same, they will not always be identical. For example, most people have no
interest in what the profits or losses of a newspaper publisher are and, contrary to the
public's interest in accurate information, a television newsstaff may produce a dis-
torted account of an event when a sensationalized story will produce higher ratings.
However, the courts have generally chosen to view the press as servants of the public.
See 100 S. Ct. at 2832-33 n.2 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring); Saxbe v. Washing-
ton Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). cf. Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). This note will follow the general trend and treat the
interests of the public and press as largely identical as far as the open trial issue is
concerned.
78. This analysis is oversimplified in at least three ways. First, it groups together
under the term "public interests," those of the press and the public. See note 77 supra.
Second, this analysis ignores independent state interests which may be important in
some circumstances. For example, it will be seen below that trial closure may promote
the states' interest in the welfare of children or in preserving marriages. See notes 179
& 190, infra. When these state interests are shared by the public--as they frequently
will be-an additional level of complexity arises; the public itself may have some inter-
ests which may be served by closed trials. Finally, this analysis is oversimplified in
viewing the public and individual interests as conflicting. It will be seen below that
this is not always the case. See note 96 and accompanying text, infra. Individual and
public interests clearly can overlap and each can occasionally be served by both open
and closed trials.
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framework for understanding the public trial controversy.
A. Public Interests
The public interests served by an open civil trial are similar
to those served by an open criminal trial. Past decisions and
legal writers have recognized that open trials serve public in-
terests by ensuring that the judicial process remains fair and
honest and by contributing to vital and informed debate on im-
portant social issues.7 9 The lesser degree of concern that the
public generally has with routine civil cases does not mean
that these interests would not be furthered to some degree by
a public right to attend civil trials.
1. The Public Interest in Fair Trials
The courts have recognized that the public, like the individ-
ual litigant, has an interest in maintaining a fair and honest
judicial system for the resolution of disputes.8 0 Observation of
the fair and orderly administration of justice helps to maintain
public faith in an important aspect of government and in the
law generally." Thus, the way in which all trials, civil and
criminal, are conducted "is preeminently a matter of public
interest."82
The authorities have argued that public trials, both civil and
criminal, can assure the fairness and honesty of the judicial
process in several ways. 3 Public scrutiny has long been seen
as an important means of discouraging abuses of judicial
power. 4 Public exposure of a tyrannical or incompetent judge
may, in theory at least, lead to his removal.8 Public and press
79. See authorities cited note 66, supra.
80. See Richmond, 448 U.S. at 594 (Brennan, J., concurring). "For a civilization
founded upon principles of ordered liberty to survive and flourish, its members must
share the conviction that they are governed equitably. That necessity ... mandates a
system of justice that demonstrates the fairness of the law to our citizens." See also In
re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
81. 448 U.S. at 569-73.
82. Id. at 596 (Brennan, J., concurring).
83. See notes 96-134 and accompanying text, infra, for a discussion of the ways in
which an open trial may lead to unfairness.
84. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948).
85. The official methods for the removal of judges, such as impeachment, have
often been ineffective for the control of the judiciary. Other means have thus been
developed, such as investigating commissions. See Note, Peeking Behind Judicial
Robes: A First Amendment Analysis of Confidential Investigations of the Judiciary, 2
Comm/ENrr L.J. 707, 708-10 (1980) [hereinafter cited as "Note, Behind Judicial Robes"].
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presence in the courtroom is thought to assure that judges re-
main honest and continue to perform at the highest level of
competence. 6
Commentators and courts have also argued that public trials
can aid in obtaining accurate testimony from all possible wit-
nesses.87 Publicity of the events or issues raised at trial may
cause more witnesses to come forward by notifying such per-
sons of the pending proceedings.88 Witnesses testifying at a
trial where the public is present may be deterred from lying for
fear that someone who hears their testimony can expose their
perjury."
2. The Public's Interest in Informed Debate
Although criminal trials in the past have drawn a large
amount of public attention more frequently than have civil tri-
als, some civil actions have great significance for much of soci-
ety. 0 Major class action suits, anti-trust actions, shareholder
derivative suits, and personal injury litigation involving
widely-used products are frequently of interest to large num-
bers of people. Where civil trials involve such important social
issues, a public trial can serve the need for public debate which
is essential for the effective operation of the democratic pro-
cess.9 1 Publicity of the facts demonstrated and the arguments
raised at trial arguably helps ensure that members of the pub..
lic are informed and thus better able to make intelligent deci..
86. See GOODWIN, supra, note 10, at 641.
87. But see notes 122-32 and accompanying text, infra, for the ways in which open
trials have been understood as having an undesirable effect on testimony. In addition
to having a general interest in the fair administration of justice, some members of the
public may have a more direct interest in accurate and complete witness testimony,
since, as Justice Brennan stated in Richmond, "mistakes of fact in civil litigation may
inflict costs upon others than the plaintiff and defendant." 448 U.S. at 596.
88. Id. at 596-97; United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 606 (3d Cir.
1969); 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS IN COMMON LAWS § 1834 (3rd ed. 1940).
89. 448 U.S. at 596.
90. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 386-307 n.15. The majority opinion
states:
[M] any of the advantages of public criminal trials are equally applicable in the
civil trial context. While the operation of the judicial process is often of inter-
est only to the parties in the litigation, this is not always the case. Iciting Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896);
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)] Thus, in some civil cases the interest
in access, and the salutary effect of publicity, may be as strong as, or stronger
than, in most criminal cases.
91. See generally, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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sions when exercising their right to self-government. Also,
when the government itself is a party to a civil suit, the public
has a strong interest in the way the case is managed and in the
positions taken on the public's behalf.
The Richmond Court recognized that these kinds of interests
merit constitutional protection under the First Amendment
freedom of press and speech clauses, declaring that "[tlhese
expressly guaranteed freedoms share a common core purpose
of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to
the functioning of government. 92 These interests may also be
protected by the First Amendment right of assembly, both in
its function "as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the
other First Amendment rights . . ."I' and as an independent
right to gather for any lawful purpose in a public place such as
a courtroom. 94
B. Individual Interests
Balanced against the public interests promoted by open tri-
als are numerous individual interests that tend to be advanced
by closed trials. Where these latter interests conflict with
those of the public, the stronger interests may determine the
outcome of the open trial issue.
The interests of the individual litigant include his interest in
a fair trial, privacy, and, occasionally, secrecy.95 While trial clo-
sure may in some circumstances be necessary to protect these
interests, some alternatives have been developed by the
courts. However, only constitutionally protected individual in-
terests can outweigh the constitutionally protected public in-
terests promoted by public trials.
1. The Litigant's Interest in a Fair Trial
Normally, one of the litigant's foremost concerns is that he
receive a fair trial. 6 Fairness is a fundamental right protected
92. 448 U.S. at 575.
93. Id. at 577.
94. Id. at 578.
95. See text accompanying notes 96-155, infra.
96. The conflict in this area of the law has been traditionally expressed as being
between fair trial and free press. E.g., Report of the Committee on the Operation of
the Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391 (1968). However,
press access to the courtroom does not always conflict with the interest of the parties
in a fair trial, and may in some circumstances serve that interest. See, e.g., AMERICAN
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by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.97
Public access has traditionally been understood to conflict with
this general interest by threatening the litigant's ability to ob-
tain: (1) an unbiased jury, (2) an unbiased judge, (3) effective
counsel, (4) accurate testimony from all available witnesses
and (5) a courtroom free of disruption.98
In the criminal cases, defendants have been able to obtain
new trials on due process "fairness" grounds only where public
and press impact on the trial was extreme.99 The defendant is
required to show some "identifiable prejudice" or that the trial
court followed procedures that involved such a high
probability that prejudice would result that the trial is
"deemed inherently lacking in due process."'100 The civil liti-
gant has fewer constitutional protections 1 ' and may have to
overcome some obstacles before his due process arguments
will be heard.10 2 Thus, the degree of press and public effect on
the trial may have to be even greater before retrial of a civil
suit will be required.
a. The litigant's interest in an unbiased jury: Although civil
trials generally have not attracted the same amount of press
coverage as have some celebrated criminal trials,103 the possi-
bility exists that a civil jury might be prejudiced by media coV-
NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASS'N, FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL (1967). See also text ac-
companying notes 80-89, supra.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Application of the due process clause to all criminal
cases is required by the language of the clause when applied to the nature of criminal
actions: "[N] or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... " Id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court has
also invoked the due process clause to oversee the fairness of a wide variety of non-
criminal hearings. E.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (hearing prior to suspension
of a student); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (hearing prior to a creditor's repos-
session of goods); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (hearing prior to termination
of welfare benefits). Unlike the automatic availability of the due process clause to a
criminal defendant, a civil litigant apparently must first show that deprivation of a "lib-
erty" or "property" interest is involved before the due process clause may be invoked.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). While such a showing would not be
difficult in the great majority of civil actions, at least for defendants, the sporadic appli-
cation of the due process clause in non-criminal matters leaves the constitutional sta-
tus of a civil litigant's fairness claims somewhat uncertain.
98. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
99. See note 98, supra. Cf. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
100. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 542-43.
101. Criminal defendants only are protected by many of the clauses of the Fifth,
Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI, VII.
102. See note 97, supra.
103. E.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333.
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erage 10 4 or by the mere presence of an emotional and biased
crowd in the courtroom.105 Analytically, this issue is much the
same whether the context is a civil or criminal trial, and was
addressed in Richmond and earlier Supreme Court deci-
sions.106 The Court in Richmond concluded that a criminal
trial should not be closed in order to prevent jury prejudice if
alternative methods are available to shield the jury from preju-
dicial information.' 7 The Court in Sheppard v. Maxwell'08 set
forth some alternatives to trial closure, including continuance,
change of venue, sequestration of the jury, and orders prohibit-
ing counsel or other officers of the court from releasing prejudi-
cial information to the press.0 9 The Court in Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart"0 discussed alternatives to prior re-
straint on the news media which can also be used as substi-
tutes for trial closure. In addition to the alternatives already
mentioned, the Nebraska Press Court raised the possibility
that prejudice could be guarded against by "searching" voir
dire questions from the trial judge"' and by "the use of em-
phatic and clear instructions on the sworn duty of each juror to
decide the issues only on evidence presented in open court.""' 2
These measures should adequately preserve the civil litigant's
interest in an unbiased jury.
b. The litigant's interest in having an unbiased judge: The
courts have acknowledged that news reports of a particular
crime might lead to the application of political pressure on a
104. See, e.g., Burnett v. National Enquirer, 7 Media L. Rptr. 1321 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1981). In the highly-publicized Burnett case, the defendant Enquirer moved for a mis-
trial after entertainer Johnny Carson publicly "blasted" (to use the trial judge's
words) the periodical on the Tonight Show during the time of the trial of the enter-
tainer Carol Burnett's libel action. Although the motion for mistrial was denied by the
trial judge (id. at 1322), the case illustrates that civil cases are as vulnerable to outside
media influences as criminal cases.
105. The possibility that the presence of a large number of reporters would influ-
ence the jury in the Oakland Raiders' suit against the National Football League
prompted the NFL attorneys to ask the trial judge to limit the number of reporters to a
pool of five. Los Angeles Daily Journal, Mar. 3, 1982, § 2, at 1, col. 1.
106. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333; Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539 (1976); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 581.
107. 448 U.S. at 581.
108. Sheppard v. Maxwell 384 U.S. at 358-63.
109. Id. at 363.
110. 427 U.S. 539.




criminal trial judge. 113 The mere presence of a large crowd in
the courtroom might sway certain judges towards the making
of politically expedient decisions. It is conceivable that similar,
pressures could arise as a result of news coverage of a civil
trial."4 An alternative to trial closure in order to cope with this
problem is continuance of the case until after an impending
judicial election. 1 5  In extreme cases, the contempt power
might be used to discourage attempts by the press to influence
a particular judge." 6 Also, the litigant's interest in having an
unbiased judge is not necessarily in conflict with the interest of
the public and press in attending trials. As mentioned above,
the possibility of public disclosure of a judge's actions by the
media may in fact provide the judge with incentive to stay hon-
est, fair and competent."17
c. The litigant's interest in effective counsel: The argument
has also occasionally been advanced that press presence and
activity in the courtroom can have an adverse effect on coun-
sel." 8 Extensive press coverage of a trial may interfere with
privileged attorney-client communications, distract and inhibit
counsel or lead a lawyer to use the publicity to advance his
own interests over those of his client." 9 Less drastic means for
113. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. at 342; Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 548-49.
114. Consider the political pressure applied to California Superior Court Judge
Egly in the Los Angeles school desegregation busing case. See, e.g., Los Angeles
Times, March 15, 1981, at 1, col. 5.
115. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 354 n.9.
116. Justice Frankfurter defended use of this measure in his dissenting opinion in
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. at 300. Part of the Bridges case involved publication of
three editorials by the Los Angeles Times critical of the defendants in three different
criminal actions, two of which arose out of labor disputes and the third involving a
woman "political boss." Id. at 272 n.17, 274 n.19. The editorials were published follow-
ing the conviction of, but prior to the sentencing or probation hearings for, the defend-
ants. The most extreme editorial stated: "Judge A. A. Scott will make a serious
mistake if he grants probation to Matthew Shannon and Kennan Holmes. This com-
munity needs the example of their assignment to the jute mill." Id. at 272 n.17. The
newspaper publisher and managing editor were cited for contempt and fined for pub-
lishing the editorials.
The contempt convictions were, however, successfully challenged on federal consti-
tutional grounds. Reversing the California courts, the Bridges majority made it clear
that the possibility of the publicity's influence on the judge "must be extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished." Id.
at 263.
117. See text accompanying notes 84-86, supra.
118. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 549, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 344.
119. See note 118, supra.
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preserving a litigant's interest in effective counsel would be to
limit, rather than totally prohibit, press activity at trial.120
Thus, the Sheppard Court suggested that restrictions on the
number of reporters and on their ability to move around inside
the courtroom bar might enhance counsel effectiveness by pre-
serving the bar as a place "reserved for counsel, providing
them a safe place in which to keep papers and exhibits, and to
confer privately with client and counsel.'
121
d. The litigant's interest in accurate testimony from all pos-
sible witnesses: Presence of the public and press at a trial can
sometimes inhibit and intimidate witnesses, keeping them
from testifying accurately or from coming forward at all. 22
This problem may arise because of the particularly sensitive
character of the testimony or witness, 23 as where the witness
is a child, or when the potential witness must fear for his safety
if his identity and the nature of his testimony become public
knowledge. 124 An open trial may also detract from the accu-
racy of testimony where a particular witness is inclined to ex-
aggerate and overdramatize the facts before a large courtroom
audience. 25 Witnesses may also be unduly influenced by the
testimony of others read in a newspaper or heard on the eve-
ning news. 26
As with the issues previously discussed, the interest of the
120. 384 U.S. at 357-63.
121. Id. at 355, 358.
122. See, e.g., Des Moines Register & Tribune Co. v. Hildreth, 181 N.W.2d 216, 219-20
(Iowa 1970). Note that the Iowa court did not accept this reason as adequate to justify
closure of the trial. Id. at 220.
123. See, e.g., State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 139 N.W.2d 800 (1966). The problem is
compounded where the witness is a child. E.g., State v. Gionfriddo, 154 Conn. 90, 221
A.2d 851 (1966). The possibility of trial closure because of the sensitive nature of par-
ticular testimony can arise in civil trials such as divorce cases. E.g., Whitney v.
Whitney, 164 Cal. App. 2d 577, 582, 330 P.2d 947 (1958) (construing CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE
§ 125 (West) (repealed 1970)). See text accompanying notes 168-176, supra.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741, 746-48 (9th Cir. 1979). It is
less likely that this problem will arise in the context of a civil trial since a party's life or
liberty is generally not at stake. However, the possibility remains that witness intimi-
dation may be attempted in an important civil suit. Partial trial closure might be
sought in such circumstances to protect the litigants' interest in hearing all available
witnesses.
125. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 547. Although the Estes Court dealt specifically
with the impact of television cameras on witnesses, the plurality acknowledged that
some of the same problems may also occur in trials covered heavily by newspapers.
Id. at 548.
126. Id. at 547; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333.
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litigant in procuring accurate testimony from all available wit-
nesses can often be protected by measures other than trial clo-
sure. These alternatives have usually been developed in
criminal cases but can be applied in civil trials as well. "Sensi-
tive" testimony, such as that concerning sexual behavior,
should rarely lead to closure of modern courts since the public
is, on the whole, increasingly mature and used to dealing with
sexual matters in a frank and open way. 127 Embarassment of
an adult witness is usually not a sufficient reason to close the
courtroom to the public.'28 Discriminate exclusion by the
judge of those spectators prone to tactless reactions can ease a
witness's embarassment and thus improve his or her testi-
mony. 129 Juvenile witnesses can be protected and encouraged
to testify by orders prohibiting the press from printing their
names.
30
When a witness appears to over-dramatize testimony in or-
der to please a large courtroom audience, judicial limitation on
the extent of press activity, such as exclusion of broadcast me-
dia or limitation on the number of newspaper reporters, may
127. As the public discards more and more of the modesty of earlier eras, this justi-
fication for trial closure will have less importance. Judicial notice of the worldly nature
of modern Americans led the court in United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 923 (3d Cir.
1949) to conclude:
[W]hatever may have been the view in a earlier and more formally modest
age, we think that the franker and more realistic attitude of the present day
[public] towards matters of sex precludes a determination that all members of
the public, the mature and experienced as well as the immature and impres-
sionable, may reasonably be excluded from the trial of a sexual offense upon
the ground of public morals.
128. State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. at 85, 139 N.W.2d at 806. The Schmit court stated:
Mere embarassment of adult witnesses with no showing of inability to testify
is not a sufficient reason to defeat such an over-balancing constitutional right.
[The criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.] The order
and decorum of the court, undoubtedly endangered by the presence of pruri-
ent-minded or sensation-seeking spectators, can usually be maintained by the
vigilant exercise of the trial judge's authority as well as by indiscriminate
exclusion.
Where the witness's embarassment makes him unable to testify at all, temporary trial
closure may be appropriate. See, e.g., Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d
745 (1956).
129. Beauchamp v. Cahill, 297 Ky. 505, 180 S.W.2d 423 (1944); but see Lexington Her-.
ald Leader Co. v. Tackett, 601 S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1980).
130. See, e.g., Brian W. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 618, 574 P.2d 788, 143 Cal. Rptr.
717 (1978). The validity of such orders under the United States Constitution is in some
question following the decision in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97
(1979), which held that the First Amendment prohibited the imposition of criminal
penalties on a newspaper for publishing the lawfully-obtained name of a juvenile crim.-
inal defendant without court permission.
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alleviate the problem. 3' The influence of news coverage of ear-
lier testimony on later witnesses may be resolved by seques-
tration of the witnesses.' 32 Full trial closure, even for a short
time, should be necessary only where the above alternatives
clearly do not adequately ensure accurate testimony.
e. The litigant's interest in a courtroom free of distuption:
Past experiences in celebrated criminal cases have shown that
unchecked press activity in a courtroom can undermine the or-
derly atmosphere necessary for a fair trial.' 33 This problem is
not fundamentally different in civil and criminal trials, and the
solutions developed in the criminal cases should also be effec-
tive in civil cases. Judicial restriction of the manner and
amount of press and public activity in the courtroom is the
simple alternative to full trial closure.13 1 Plainly, the issues
which arise when a party's interest in a fair trial is in conflict
with the public's interest in an open trial are largely identical
in civil and criminal trials. Alternatives to full trial closure for
the protection of the litigant's interest in a fair trial have been
developed to deal with most situations and can be equally ef-
fective in civil and criminal trials.
2. The Litigant's Interest in Privacy
One area of distinction between civil and criminal trials may
be the degree of privacy which parties to each type of proceed-
ing can reasonably expect. A civil litigant's constitutional right
of privacy may present a formidable obstacle to the formaliza-
tion of a constitutional public right to attend civil trials.3 5 Ar-
131. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 547-48.
132. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 359.
133. See id. at 342-45. The problems can be exacerbated when the broadcast media
are present in the courtroom. See cases cited note 16, supra.
134. The Sheppard Court made some specific suggestions along these lines:
The carnival atmosphere at trial could easily have been avoided since the
courtroom and courthouse premises are subject to the control of the court...
Bearing in mind the massive pretrial publicity, the judge should have adopted
stricter rules governing the use of the courtroom by newsmen ... The number
of reporters in the courtroom itself could have been limited at the first sign
that their presence would disrupt the trial. They certainly should not have
been placed inside the bar. Furthermore, the judge should have more closely
regulated the conduct of newsmen in the courtroom. For instance, the judge
belatedly asked them not to handle and photograph trial exhibits lying on the
counsel table during recesses.
Id. at 358.
135. The right of privacy constitutionalized in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
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guably, the civil litigant has a greater right of privacy than does
the criminal defendant due to the nature of the proceedings. A
criminal defendant is accused of a crime against society as a
whole; "the State" or "the People" are always a party to crimi-
nal trials. 36 Civil litigation, on the other hand, often only in-
volves private parties and private disputes of little interest to
society at large. Some civil proceedings, such as divorce ac-
tions, juvenile proceedings, other family law matters, will con-
tests where capacity is an issue, and personal injury actions in
which extensive medical records are presented, are particu-.
larly sensitive, arguably demanding recognition of greater pri..
vacy rights for the litigants. 137
While the litigant's constitutional right of privacy has not
been expressly recognized by the United States Supreme
Court as a factor in deciding the public trial issue,138 the con.-
flict between privacy rights and freedom of speech and of the
press has been extensively discussed in other contexts. 39 The
usual way for a person to enforce his interest in privacy is by
(1965), like the right of public access to criminal trials recognized in Richmond, is not
expressly stated in the First Amendment. Both rights are "implicit", to be found in
what Justice Douglas described as the "penumbra" of the First Amendment. Id. at 484.
Later decisions leave the exact constitutional source of the privacy right in doubt, the
latest pronouncement indicating that it is founded in the "Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Both rights would
seem to be of equal weight, although no court has reached this issue. The open trial is,
however, part of an older tradition than is the relatively recently-developed right to
privacy. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 802-04 (4th ed. 1971) for a
short history of the common law right of privacy. On the other hand, the right of pri-
vacy was recognized as a constitutional right several years before the establishment of
the right of access to criminal trials in 1980. This note will assume that both rights will
be treated by the courts as having equal legal significance and weight.
136. See note 72, supra.
137. In recognition of the sensitive nature of some types of civil proceedings, many
states provide for mandatory or discretionary exclusion of the public and press in
some circumstances. See notes 168-74, and accompanying text, infra. Certain criminal
proceedings may also involve highly sensitive issues. Testimony in rape cases may be
as sensitive as allegations of physical abuse or infidelity in divorce actions. Criminal
insanity hearings are equally as sensitive as civil trials where capacity is an issue.
Prior to Richmond, these kinds of criminal proceedings were occasionally closed to the
public and press. E.g., State v. Gionfriddo, 154 Conn. 90, 93, 221 A.2d 851, 852 (1966);
N.Y. JUD. LAw § 4 (McKinney). The existence of these sensitive issues did not, how-
ever, prevent the United States Supreme Court from finding a right of access to crimi-
nal trials.
138. The Court in Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 344, did refer in a general way to the imposi-
tion by the press on the defendant's privacy, but without discussion of the Constitu-
tional ramifications.
139. See notes 141-50 and accompanying text, infra.
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an action in tort. 4 ' Such actions have sometimes precipitated
the conflict between the individual's interest in privacy and the
public's interest in free speech and press.'4 ' The way the
Supreme Court has resolved this conflict in invasion of privacy
actions may reveal how the Court will resolve the conflict be-
tween the same interests in the public trial issue.
Time, Inc. v. Hill'" held that the press protections developed
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,143 which made it more diffi-
cult for a public figure plaintiff to prevail in a defamation ac-
tion,'" also apply to invasion of privacy actions. Subsequent
litigation of the "public figure" issue14 indicates that mere par-
ticipation in a legal proceeding does not automatically lead to
reduced protection against defamation and invasion of pri-
vacy. 46 One conclusion that may be drawn from this line of
cases is that an individual does not discard his right of privacy
when he enters the courtroom as a litigant.
The case of Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn '41 is particularly
revealing of the way the Court resolves the conflict between
privacy rights and free speech and press rights. In Cox, the
issue raised was whether the broadcast of a deceased rape vic-
tim's name in violation of a state statute constituted an action-
able invasion of privacy despite the First Amendment freedom
of press clause.'48 Because the victim's name was a matter of
public record in Cox, 49 the issue of whether an individual's
140. See W. PROSSER, supra note 135, at 802-15.
141. E.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
142. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
143. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
144. New York Times requires a public figure plaintiff to show the defendant acted
with "malice" in order to prevail. Id. at 279-80.
145. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
146. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). In this regard, the Court stated:
The details of many, if not most, courtroom battles would add almost nothing
toward advancing the uninhibited debate on public issues thought to provide
principal support for the decision in New York Times [citation omitted]. And
while participants in some litigation may be legitimate 'public figures,' either
generally or for the limited purpose of that litigation, the majority will more
likely resemble respondent, drawn into a public forum largely against their
will in order to attempt to obtain the only redress available to them or to de-
fend themselves against actions brought by the state or by others. Id. at 457.
See also Littlefield v. Fort Dodge Messenger, 614 F.2d 581 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S.
Ct. 1342 (1980); But see Orr v. Argus-Press, 586 F.2d 1108, 1116 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 960 (1978).
147. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
148. Id. at 471.
149. Id. at 472-73.
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privacy interest can prevent a judicial proceeding from becom-
ing a public matter in the first place was not reached. Nonethe-
less, Cox, by holding that publication of the victim's name was
protected by the First Amendment, 150 illustrated that freedom
of speech and press interests can in some circumstances over-
ride an individual's right of privacy. In summary, for purposes
of this aspect of the public trial question, Cox and the defama-
tion cases demonstrate that while a litigant may retain some
privacy rights at trial, they can be subordinated to the public's
free speech and press interests.
3. Litigant's Interest in Secrecy
In addition to an interest in privacy, individual litigants may
in some circumstances have an interest in keeping certain in-
formation and communications secret. Whether this interest
has any connection to the right of privacy is uncertain, and
consequently so is its status as a constitutionally-protected
right.'5' Trial closure, though, is one means of preserving se-
crecy. This issue most often arises in litigation involving trade
secrets. 52 Protection of trade secrets can be an issue in crimi-
nal contempt proceedings as well as civil litigation, 153 and there
is some indication that the Supreme Court considered this in-
dividual interest in establishing the First Amendment right of
access in Richmond."M Since the existence of criminal actions
150. Id. at 494-95.
151. Those statutes and decisions authorizing trial closure arguably are sometimes
necessary to give effect to federal copyright and patent laws, passed under the author-
ity of article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution. It could therefore be argued
that a competing consideration arises where the public demands a right to hear a trade
secret trial.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 reads "The Congress shall have Power. . .To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .. ." To
the author's knowledge, this theory has not been advanced in any case to date. How-
ever, it has not yet been necessary to do so since the right to attend has never before
been elevated to a constitutional level.
The conflict between constitutional copyright and patent protection has been mani-
fested in another context: some writers have argued that copyright protection can in-
fringe on First Amendment freedom of speech and press provisions. See generally
Note, Copyright Infringement and the First Amendment, 79 COLUm. L. REV. 320 (1979).
152. See generally Annot., 62 A.L.R. 2d 509. Trials involving national secrets can
also raise the possibility of a closed hearing. This issue is far more likely to arise in a
criminal action than a civil one. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714-16
(1975).
153. E.g., Stamicarbon, N.V. v. American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1974).
154. 448 U.S. at 600 n.5. Justice Stewart wrote: "The preservation of trade secrets
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involving trade secrets did not preclude a finding of a public
right to attend criminal trials, it seems unlikely that the need
to protect trade secrets would preclude the establishment of an
equivalent right to attend civil trials.'
V
Forecast: A Right to Attend Civil Trials on the
Constitutional Horizon?
If the Supreme Court chooses to address the issue of public
access to civil trials, several different courses are available to
it. The Court may flatly refuse to recognize a constitutional
right to attend civil trials because it finds some fundamental
distinction between civil trials which requires a result opposite
from that reached in Richmond. Or, the Court may deal with
the problem on an ad hoc basis: deciding that one particular
civil trial judge was justified in his exclusion of the public from
the court on the facts of the particular case, while in another
case deciding that the judge's exclusion of the public was un-
warranted for some reason. Alternatively, the Court may re-
fuse to examine the issue in terms of all civil actions, instead
developing a different analysis, and possibly a different rule,
for each general type of civil action. Finally, the Court may
take an approach similar to the one taken in Richmond: recog-
nizing a broad general rule that the public and press have a
constitutional right to attend all civil trials, while leaving the
development of possible exceptions to the general rule for later
decisions. In light of the recent use of the latter approach in
Richmond, this note will restrict further speculation to an at-
tempt to answer whether or not the Court is likely to follow a
similar course in regards to civil trials; that is, whether the
Court is likely to recognize a general First Amendment right of
the public to attend civil trials.
There does not seem to be any issue which would preclude
Supreme Court recognition of a constitutional right to attend
civil trials. Since the historical openness of criminal trials pro-
vided the Richmond Court with a basis for the creation of a
right of access, the parallel tradition of open civil trials 56 may
... might justify the exclusion of the public from at least some segments of a civil
trial." Id.
155. See text accompanying notes 185-86, infra.
156. See text accompanying notes 54-68, supra.
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compel an extension of Richmond to that sphere. At one time
or another, all of the justices on the Richmond Court have ac-
knowledged the importance of the public civil trial tradition. 15 7
Although only Justice Stewart has expressly stated that there
is a First Amendment right of access to civil trials,5 8 these
other statements indicate that at least some of the other jus-.
tices may be willing to join Justice Stewart. For example, in
his concurring opinion in Richmond, Justice Brennan clearly
contemplated civil as well as criminal trials in discussing the
right of access.15 9 Delineating the important interests served
by public trials, he twice referred to these interests in the con-
text of civil proceedings.
60
One of the difficulties which prevented the Gannett Court
from holding that the public has a Sixth Amendment right to
attend a criminal pre-trial hearing was the lack of an historical
basis for limiting public access exclusively to criminal cases.' 6 1
This posed a problem since the Sixth Amendment clearly re-
lates only to criminal proceedings. 62 In rejecting the asser-
tions by Gannett Co. attorneys that there was such a Sixth
Amendment right, the Court revealingly stated:
If the existence of a common-law rule were the test for whether
there is a Sixth Amendment public right to a public trial....
there would be such a right in civil as well as criminal cases
.... In short, there is no principled basis upon which a public
right of access to judicial proceedings can be limited to crimi-
nal cases if the scope of the right is defined by the common law
rather than the text and structure of the Constitution. 63
157. See quotation from Gannett, note 67, supra. Most of the Richmond opinions
expressly or impliedly reiterated the Court's recognition of the commonlaw tradition
of open civil trials. See note 68 and accompanying text, supra. In Richmond, Justices
Brennan and Marshall acknowledged the historical openness of the civil trial when
they quoted the following statement written by Justice Blackmun in Gannett:
"[T] here is little record, if any, of secret proceedings, criminal or civil, having occurred
at any time in known English history." 448 U.S. at 590. That Justice Stewart was refer-
ring to civil as well as criminal trials in his statement that "it has for centuries been a
basic presupposition of the Anglo-American legal system that trials shall be public
trials." (Id. at 599) is evident from his earlier conclusion that "the First and Four-
teenth Amendments clearly give the press and the public a right of access to trials
themselves, civil as well as criminal." Id. (footnote omitted).
158. 448 U.S. at 599.
159. Id. at 596.
160. Id. See also note 157, supra.
161. 443 U.S. at 385-86 n.15.
162. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI reads in part as follows: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. . ....
163. 443 U.S. at 386 n.15.
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Unlike the Sixth Amendment,'64 there is nothing in the "text
and structure" of the First Amendment which restricts its ap-
plication to criminal proceedings. 165 Since the existence of the
common law rule became a major test for finding a First
Amendment public right of access in Richmond, the logic of
the lead opinion in Gannett seems to compel a finding of the
same right for civil cases.
The Court has already sanctioned means of protecting indi-
vidual interests which are less drastic than full trial closure
lessening the chance that individual interests will persuade
the Court not to recognize a public right of access to civil trials.
If the Court chooses to hear a case raising the issue, it is thus
very likely the Court will establish a First Amendment public
right to attend civil trials.
VI
Impact of a Public Right to Attend on
Future Civil Trials
Although the recognition of a First Amendment right to at-
tend is not a foregone conclusion, it seems probable. An exam-
ination of the impact that such a decision might have is
therefore worthwhile. Since civil trials are already open to the
public in most jurisdictions,'6 6 elevating this tradition to a con-
stitutional level will not cause any great change in most cir-
cumstances. However, many jurisdictions also recognize
exceptions to the public trial norm.'67 In determining what im-
pact an expansion of Richmond might have, it is necessary to
determine whether any of the currently recognized exceptions
will remain viable in the face of a constitutinal right to attend.
A. Currently Recognized Exceptions to the Open-Trial Rule
Throughout Anglo-American judicial history, the public and
press have often been excluded from particular types of civil
proceedings and in cases having certain common sets of cir-
cumstances. 168 These situations can be seen as instances in
164. See note 162, supra.
165. The applicable portions of U.S. CONST. amend. I read: "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
166. See notes 64-66 and accompanying text, supra.
167. See text accompanying notes 168-86, infra.
168. See generally Annot., 79 A.L.R. 3d 401-09; E. JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW
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which the individual interests promoted by trial closure out-
weigh the interests served by public attendance. In many
states, judges are authorized to close certain family law pro-
ceedings.169 For example, many states give trial judges the
power to close divorce or dissolution proceedings to the pub-
lic.17° A judge's power to close civil trials has also been recog-
nized when children are parties, witnesses, or otherwise
intimately involved in a case, as indicated by numerous stat-
utes which provide for closure of adoption,' 7' custody, 7 2 or
civil paternity'73 hearings. Other states have statutes or court
rules which give a trial judge broad powers to exclude the pub-
lic and press in any kind of family law case where the welfare
of a child might otherwise be jeopardized. 74 Controversy has
already arisen in some child custody cases where the trial
judge has conducted a private in camera interview with the
child. 75 These cases have focused on whether the due process
rights of the parents have been violated by the interview. 76
Establishment of a constitutional right on the part of the public
to attend civil trials would add an additional factor for a judge
to consider in such cases, and might tip the balance against
74 (6th ed. 1967). In addition to those hearings discussed in the text accompanying
notes 168-97, infra, other closed proceedings of interest to the legal profession include
disciplinary hearings for attorneys and judges. For a discussion of secret judicial hear-
ings see Note, Behind Judicial Robes, supra note 85. For an example of state court
approval of closed attorney disciplinary hearings, see Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Disciplinary Board of Supreme Court, 468 Pa. 382, 363 A.2d 779 (1976).
These proceedings are beyond the scope of this note and thus mentioned only briefly
here because they are not formal trials, and are not easily categorized as either civil or
criminal in nature. E.g., In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597, 602, 223 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1975).
169. See notes 171-174, infra.
170. State ex rel. English v. McCrary, 328 So. 2d 257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); IDAHO
R. CIV. P. 77(b); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.8 (West 1975); N.Y. JuD. LAw § 4 (McKinney
1968); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-4 (1953).
171. E.g., CAL. Cwy. CODE § 226m (West 1954); F.A. STAT. ANN. § 63.162 (West Supp.
1982); HAWArr REV. STAT. § 578-15 (1976).
172. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-128 (1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.8 (West 19 7 5)
N.J. STAT. ANN. 9:2-1 (West 1976); UNIF. MARRIAGE & DrVORCE ACT § 406 (1971).
173. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2344 (1981); HAWAn REV. STAT. § 584-20 (1976); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 13-112 (1975); UNiF. PARENTAGE ACT § 20, 9A U.L.A. 612 (1979).
174. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-11 (West 1958); S.C. FAM. CT. R. 14.
175. See Annot., 99 A.L.R. 2d 954-965 (1965). This dispute arises where a judge hear..
big a child custody matter conducts a private interview with the child involved. Not
only. is the public excluded in this situation, but one or both of the parents are not
allowed to be present. These circumstances have frequently led to challenge on ap-
peal by the party or parties excluded from the interview; courts are split on the propri-
ety of the judge's action. Id.
176. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Jenkins, 125 Cal. App. 2d 109, 269 P.2d 908 (1954).
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trial closure. 77
In addition to "true" civil proceedings involving children, a
majority of American jurisdictions consider all matters
brought before the juvenile courts to be civil in nature, even
where the youth involved is accused of acts which would con-
stitute crimes in adult court.178 When a minor is accused of
such acts, the state's interest in rehabilitation of the juvenile
often mandates confidentiality. 179 Closure of the trial is only
one of the methods available for preservation of
confidentiality. 80
In addition to family law hearings, trials where evidence to
be presented is "vulgar" or "obscene" entitles judges in some
states to exclude the public from the courtroom.' 81 In such
cases, general exclusion of the public and press in order to pro-
tect public morals has been criticized by some courts because
of the relatively sophisticated nature of the present-day Ameri-
can public. 82 Accordingly, some states limit a judge's power in
these cases to the ability to clear the court of minors only.18 3
While protection of the public may not justify trial closure in
these circumstances, the privacy interests of the parties or pro-
tection of a sensitive and reluctant witness, together with the
need for complete and accurate testimony, may require a judge
177. Note that the plurality was critical of the trial judge in the Richmond case be-
cause "no recognition of any right under the Constitution for the public or press to
attend the trial" was made. 448 U.S. at 581.
178. See In re Lewis, 51 Wash. 2d 193, 198-20, 316 P.2d 907, 910-11 (1957). Whether
such "quasi-criminal" actions are covered by the Richmond decision is not clear at this
time. If Richmond does not apply because of the technically "civil" nature of these
actions, the conflict between closed juvenile proceedings of this kind and a public right
of access must be addressed at some future time.
179. See generally Cohen, Reconciling Media Access with Confidentiality for the In-
dividual in Juvenile Court, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 405 (1980). The conflict between
the free press and the state's interest in juvenile rehabilitation has been extensively
discussed with regard to cases where confidentiality is preserved by prohibiting the
publication of the alleged offender's name. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443
U.S. 97 (1979); Note, Freedom of the Press vs. Juvenile Anonymity: A Conflict Between
Constitutional Priorities and Rehabilitation, 65 IowA L. REV. 1471 (1980).
180. See Cohen, supra note 179. Cf. In re Robert M., 439 N.Y.S. 2d 986 (1981); In re
Lewis, 51 Wash. 2d 193, 316 P.2d 907 (1957). A less drastic and more common means for
preserving confidentiality is a proscription against disclosure of the juvenile's name.
See generally Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
181. E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-9 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 81-1006 (1956).
182. See note 127, supra.
183. E.g., MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 546.37 (West 1971); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 256.14 (West
1971). See also MAss. GEN. LAws Am. ch. 220, § 13 (West 1958); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.




to exclude the public and press. 184
Judges have also closed trials to the public and press when
litigation involves trade secrets. 85 Trial closure in these cir-
cumstances is not ordered for the protection of a personal pri-
vacy interest but for the protection of an economic interest in a
secret manufacturing process or chemical formula. Although
there has been little discussion of the rationale behind trial
closure in this situation, the same policies which favor the evi-
dentiary trade secret privilege'86 necessitate exclusion of the
public and press in these cases.
Although given the power, the courts have been reluctant to
close trials. This reluctance has been based on state constitu-
tional grounds 87 and the common law tradition of public tri-
als.8 8 Still, it is not difficult to imagine circumstances in a trial
involving minors where the state's interest in the welfare of
children, together with the child's own interests and those of
his parents, could outweigh the public interests served by an
open trial. 8 9 In addition, a strong argument may be advanced
for the proposition that an adult's privacy interest overshad-
ows the public interests in divorce, paternity, and other domes-
tic relations cases. 190 It is rare that the public at large has any
legitimate reason, except for the general purposes served by
184. See text accompanying notes 122-32, supra.
185. Gai Audio of New York, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 27 Md. App.
172, 197, 340 A.2d 736, 751 (1975); Taylor Iron & Steel Co. v. Nichols, 73 N.J. Eq. 684, 69 A.
186 (1908); Annot., 62 A.L.R. 2d 509 (1958). See also CAL. EVID. CODE § 915(b) (West
1954). Trade secrets can also be involved in criminal actions. See note 153, supra.
186. See, e.g., 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2212 (McNaughten rev. ed. 1961); CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1060 (West 1954).
187. State ex rel. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. Deiz, 289 Or. 277, 613 P.2d 23 (1980).
Cf. In re Lewis, 51 Wash. 2d 193, 316 P.2d 907 (1957).
188. See Raper v. errier, 246 N.C. 193, 97 S.E.2d 782 (1954).
189. See, e.g., Hassler v. District of Columbia, 238 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Rea v.
Rea, 195 Or. 252, 258, 245 P.2d 884, 886 (1952). But see State ex rel. Oregonian Publishing
Co. v. Diez, 289 Or. 277, 613 P.2d 23 (1980). Criminal trials can also involve a juvenile as
a witness. See notes 197-98 and accompanying text, infra. A complete discussion of all
the special issues which arise in regard to publicity of proceedings involving juveniles
is not possible here. This note merely seeks to draw attention to potential problems
which may arise in this area if a constitutional right to attend civil trials is recognized.
190. See, e.g., State ex rel. Gore Newspapers Co. v. Tyson, 313 So. 2d at 789-90
(Walden, J., dissenting) where the dissenting judge expressed his concern that "any
busybodies seeking tid bits for bridge table or locker room gossip" could attend a di-
vorce trial if an unlimited right of access is recognized.
At least one court has recognized an additional factor to be considered in the issue of
public presence at divorce trials: the state's interest in perpetuating the marital rela-
tionship. Id. at 784. This interest did not prevent the Gore court from restraining the
trial judge from closing the proceedings.
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all open trials, to hear the merits of a domestic relations
case.19' When considered with the need to protect trade
secrets and national security, it is apparent that it will be nec-
essary to give continued recognition to some exceptions to any
public civil trial rule.
The Richmond court made it clear that the right to attend
criminal trials is not absolute and will be subordinated to
"overriding interests."'92 The same qualification could, and
probably would, be made to any public right to attend civil tri-
als. Further litigation would then be necessary to determine
which interests are "overriding". More specifically, the courts
would be required to determine on a case-by-case basis what
interests and circumstances require trial closure despite the
constitutional preference for open trials. It may be found that
the interests protected by some or all of the traditional excep-
tions are "overriding interests" within the meaning of
Richmond.
The Richmond decision indicates that such a solution is con-
templated by the Court. For example, in his concurring opin-
ion, Justice Stewart specifically mentioned the trade-secrets
exception, indicating that it would remain viable following
Richmond.'93 Justice Stewart also noted that a criminal trial
might still be closed during the testimony of a youthful wit-
ness.' 94 The concurring opinion of Justice Brennan, joined by
Justice Marshall, suggests a possible exception to the open
trial where national security interests are involved in litiga-
tion. 9 The plurality also suggested the possibility of limiting
public attendance for preservation of courtroom order. 96
Some clarification of the exceptional circumstances that will
justify criminal trial closure may be forthcoming. The Court
has noted probable jurisdiction in Globe Newspaper v. Supe-
191. Although not actually a divorce case, the celebrated case of Marvin v. Marvin,
18 Cal. 3d 660, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106 (1976) is one notable exception. Although
the legitimacy of public interest in every intimate detail of the relationship between
Mr. and Ms. Marvin is questionable, the larger issues raised by the dispute concerning
the property rights of unmarried couples who live together, in some ways inseparable
from the details, were of unmistakable social importance.
192. 448 U.S. at 581-82 n.18.
193. Id. at 600 n.5 (Stewart, J., concurring).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 598 n.24 (Brennan, J., concurring). Michigan makes its public court stat-
ute inapplicable to cases involving national security. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1420
(1981).
196. 448 U.S. at 581-82 n.18.
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rior Court,"7 which involves closure of a criminal trial during
testimony by a juvenile rape victim. The trial judge's actions
were twice upheld by the Massachusetts Supreme Court.'9 8
Globe represents an opportunity for the United States
Supreme Court to more fully examine and define the circum-
stances which will allow a trial judge to exclude the public and
press from a trial. Since the Globe trial was closed to protect a
minor, the Court specifically has the opportunity to explore the
extent to which a child's interests may outweigh the public's
right to attend criminal trials. If the Court chooses to issue
such an opinion, it will have broad implications for the many
civil proceedings involving children, and may provide some
guidance to trial judges asked to exclude the public in those
cases.
B. Validity of Current State Closure Rules
It is necessary to examine a particular statute or judicial rule
allowing a trial closure in order to predict whether it would re-
main constitutionally valid following an extension of the Rich-
mond holding to civil trials. The state rules creating open-trial
exceptions are of two basic types: discretionary and
mandatory.
The first type of rule gives a trial judge discretionary power
to exclude the public and press from the courtroom. Within
this broad category, there are many statutory variations. For
example, some states give a trial judge broad discretionary au-
thority to close any kind of civil trial,19 9 while others restrict
197. - Mass. -, 423 N.E.2d 723 (1981), prob. jurisdiction noted, No. 81-611.
198. The Massachusetts supreme court affirmed the trial judge's actions prior to the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Richmond. - Mass. -, 401 N.E.2d 360 (1980). This
case has been referred to as "Globe L" The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court, who remanded to the Massachusetts court for another review in light of Rich-
mond. 449 U.S. 894 (1980). The Massachusetts court again upheld the trial judge's clo-
sure of the trial in its 1981 Globe II decision. - Mass. -, 423 N.E.2d 723 (1981).
199. E.g., PA. R. Civ. P. § 223. The Pennsylvania rule states in relevant part:
(a) Subject to the requirements of due process of law and of the constitu-
tional rights of the parties, the court may make and enforce rules and orders
covering any of the following matters, inter alia: . . . (4) Regulating or exclud-
ing the public or persons not interested in the proceedings whenever the court
deems such regulation or exclusion to be in the interest of the public good,
order or morals.
Although the statute makes the judge's power subject to the constitutional rights of
the parties, there is no express requirement that the judge consider the constitutional
rights of the public to attend the trial.
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this broad power to chancery courts,200 and still others bestow
discretionary power only in particular types of proceedings.2 °'
Typically, a state restricts its judges' discretionary power to di-
vorce actions, child custody hearings, or any actions where
children are involved. °2
The discretionary rules do not appear to be entirely incom-
patible with Richmond since a presumption of openness is im-
plied; some reason for trial closure is usually required.0 3
However, within this general type of rule, the amount of discre-
tion given to a trial judge varies greatly.204 A rule giving a
judge too much discretion may not satisfy the "overriding in-
terest" requirement of Richmond.205 Also, the closure of a par-
ticular trial in a jurisdiction operating under a valid
discretionary closure rule may fail to survive a constitutional
challenge if the judge's reasons for excluding the public or
press are not "articulated in findings '20 6 or do not show the
existence of "overriding interests. '2 7 Thus, while the basic
legislative rule may be constitutional, litigation may still prolif-
erate regarding particular exercises of judicial discretion in ap-
plication of the rule.
The second type of rule makes trial closure mandatory for
certain kinds of proceedings. Proceedings where closure is
mandatory in many states include adoption hearings208 and
200. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-404.1 (1962); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 344 (1974). The
Delaware statute reads: "All jurisdiction and powers of the Court of Chancery may be
exercised in chambers."
201. See notes 170-171 & 174 supra.
202. The New York statute is typical: "[In cases for divorce ... the court may, in
its discretion, exclude therefrom all persons who are not directly interested therein,
excepting jurors, witnesses, and officers of the court." N.Y. JUD. LAw § 4 (McKinney
1968).
203. The language in Richmond suggests that the First Amendment in effect creates
a presumption of openness, with the burden of showing the existence of an "overriding
interest" on the party seeking to close the trial. This would seem to follow from the
statement that, "[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a
criminal case must be open to the public." 448 U.S. at 580 (footnote omitted).
204. For example, compare the broad authority given Pennsylvania trial judges in
the statute quoted in note 199, supra, with the more restrictive New York statute in
note 202, supra.
205. See note 203, supra.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See note 171, supra. CAL. CrV. CODE § 226m (West 1954) reads:
"All superior court hearings in adoption proceedings shall be held in private, and the
court shall exclude all persons except the officers of the court, the parties, their wit-
nesses, counsel, and representatives of the agencies present to perform their official
duties under the laws governing adoptions."
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civil paternity actions." 9 Juvenile court hearings are also fre-
quently subject to mandatory closure.2 10 Some states mandate
closure of child custody hearings under certain circum-
stances.21 Other states provide for mandatory exclusion of the
public and press when requested by one or all of the parties.21
Rules of this type would probably be found constitutionally
deficient under an extension of Richmond since they fail to re-
quire the trial judge to articulate his reasons for closing the
trial in findings.213 Such mandatory statutes would also be
subject to constitutional attack on grounds that they are over-
broad. Thus, some redrafting of statutes may be required if
Richmond is extended.
An additional impact of an extension of Richmond would
certainly be a decrease in local control over the standards gov-
erning trial closure. This was a major concern in Justice Rehn-
quist's Richmond dissent.214 Under current law, the power to
determine which circumstances authorize trial closure lies
with the various state legislatures and courts. Establishment
of a federal constitutional right will give the last word on this
subject to the United States Supreme Court whenever trial clo-
sure is attacked. The loss of local control will be accompanied
by greater national uniformity. Depending on whether the
209. See note 173, supra. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 20, 9A U.L.A. 612 (1979) reads in
relevant part:
"Notwithstanding any other law concerning public hearings and records, any hear-
ing or trial held under this Act shall be held in closed court without admittance of any
person other than those necessary to the action or proceeding ......
210. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 16"1813 (1979). The District of Columbia's mandatory juve-
nile court closure statute may forestall a constitutional attack by allowing admission of
the public and press if they refrain from disclosing the identity of the juvenile in-
volved. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 16-2316(e) (West 1966).
211. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 9:2-1 (West 1976), which states in relevant part:
If the minor child or minor children have not, at the commencement of the
action, reached the age of sixteen years, and if it is represented to the court by
affadavit or under oath that evidence will be adduced involving the moral tur-
pitude of either parent, or of such minor child or children, or that evidence will
be adduced which may reflect upon the good reputation or social standing of
the child or children, then the court shall admit to the hearing of such case
only such persons as are directly interested in the matter being then heard.
212. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-404.1 (1962); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 16-2344 (West
Supp. 1970). The District of Columbia statute reads:
"Upon trial or proceedings over which the Division has jurisdiction under paragraph
(3), (4), (10) or (11) of section 11-1101 [child support, custody, and paternity actions]
the court may exclude the general public and, at the request of either party, shall ex-
clude the general public."
213. See note 203, supra.
214. 448 U.S. at 604-06.
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Supreme Court generally favors individual or public interests,
new federal trial closure standards may be more or less strin-
gent than the current rule in a given jurisdiction. Whether a
local jurisdiction will be free to impose stricter requirements
for trial closure than those mandated by the Supreme Court is
questionable since this greater concern for public and press in-
terests would reflect decreased sensitivity to the competing in-
dividual interests involved-some of which are also protected
by the federal constitution. These issues will therefore have to
be resolved by future litigation.
VII
Conclusion
It is probable that the Richmond public right to attend crimi-
nal trials will someday be extended to civil trials. Since civil
trials have traditionally been open to the public, such a deci-
sion would probably not cause a great deal of disruption of or
change in current practices. However, much litigation will un-
doubtedly be required to determine the circumstances under
which a judge may still close the courtroom doors to the public
and press. Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court21 5 may mark
the beginning of such litigation. Some existing state closure
rules will also probably be declared unconstitutional. How-
ever, substantial change in current civil trial practice will be
averted if the Supreme Court finds existing public trial excep-
tions to be constitutionally acceptable. It is hoped Globe will
provide some help in this area. While an extension of Rich-
mond may not cause any revolutions in trial practice, it should
be welcomed by the press and public as an important step to-
wards increasing recognition of constitutionally protected pub-
lic access to governmental processes.
215. See notes 197-98 and accompanying text, supra.
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